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Can Researchers Keep Up?
Thomas B. King, Daniel A. Nuxoll, and Timothy J. Yeager
represent the nature of bank deterioration. Indeed,
the few observations that we have of recent bank
failures provide evidence consistent with this
hypothesis.
The changes in the banking environment call
for renewed research into the causes of bank
distress. The federal supervisory agencies have
established research programs pursuing this goal,
but—because regulatory banking economists often
work on projects with confidential data and
because many ongoing projects are not formally
disclosed to the public—it can be difficult for
outside economists to benefit from this work. By
describing some efforts that are currently under-
way to develop new early-warning models at the
Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), we attempt to bridge that gap
in the hope of stimulating more research in this
area beyond that done by government agencies.
One strand of the new monitoring devices attempts
U
nderstanding the causes of insolvency
at financial institutions is important
for both academic and regulatory
reasons, and the effort to model bank
deterioration was once a vibrant area of study
in empirical finance. Significant advances were
made between the late 1960s and late 1980s.
Since then, research has slowed considerably on
the characteristics of banks headed for trouble,
reflecting a sense among researchers that the
causes of banking problems are unchanging and
well understood. In this article, we argue that this
complacency may be unwarranted.1 The rapid
pace of technological and institutional change in
the banking sector in recent years suggests that
the dominant models may no longer accurately
Since 1990, the banking sector has experienced enormous legislative, technological, and financial
changes, yet research into the causes of bank distress has slowed. One consequence is that tradi-
tional supervisory surveillance models may not capture important risks inherent in the current
banking environment. After reviewing the history of these models, the authors provide empirical
evidence that the characteristics of failing banks have changed in the past ten years and argue that
the time is right for new research that employs new empirical techniques. In particular, dynamic
models that use forward-looking variables and address various types of bank risk individually are
promising lines of inquiry. Supervisory agencies have begun to move in these directions, and the
authors describe several examples of this new generation of early-warning models that are not yet
widely known among academic banking economists.
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1 Note that we are not claiming that bank regulators have grown
complacent, only that the academic community has focused its
attention away from this issue.
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by adopting a more theoretical approach using
forward-looking variables. Another strand isolates
and models unique banking risks to facilitate the
risk-focused approach to bank supervision. A
common objective of these models is an increased
flexibility that will allow off-site surveillance to
better keep pace with the dynamic banking envi-
ronment going forward.
SURVEILLANCE MODELS IN 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Federal bank supervisors primarily use limited-
dependent-variable regression models for off-site
monitoring. Although we argue later that these
models (like all models) have shortcomings, they
reflect years of advancement in academic research,
econometric modeling, and computer technology.
In this section, we describe the evolution of off-
site surveillance models, paying particular atten-
tion to the link between academic research and
supervisory applications. Table 1 summarizes the
evolution of various off-site surveillance systems
at the Federal supervisory agencies from the mid-
1970s to the present. The systems transitioned
from simple screens, to hybrid models, to the
econometric models used today.
Discriminant Analysis and Supervisory
Screens
During the 1960s, several studies attempted
to determine the usefulness of various financial
ratios in predicting bankruptcy in non-bank firms.
In his seminal article, Altman (1968) used discrimi-
nant analysis over five variables to determine the
characteristics of manufacturing firms headed
for bankruptcy. His paper ushered in a wave of
research applying similar methodology specifi-
cally to depository institutions, including Stuhr
and van Wicklen (1974), Sinkey (1975, 1978),
Altman (1977), and Rose and Scott (1978).
Much of this early research on bank distress
was conducted by economists within supervisory
agencies, and some of it was specifically directed
toward the establishment of an off-site early-
warning model for use in everyday supervision.
Because discrete-response-regression techniques
were still relatively new and too computationally
intensive to be practical, the initial screen-based
systems adopted by all three federal agencies
relied on a variant of discriminant analysis, com-
paring selected ratios to predetermined cutoff
points and classifying banks accordingly. 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) adopted the first formal screen-based system
called the National Bank Surveillance System
(NBSS) in 1975. Previously, off-site monitoring
had consisted largely of informal rules of thumb
based on individual financial ratios. According
to White (1992), the impetus for the shift toward
a more systematic approach was the OCC’s failure
to detect the financial difficulties at two large
institutions—United States National Bank and
Franklin National Bank—that became insolvent
in the early 1970s. The OCC’s response to these
shortcomings in off-site surveillance was, in part,
to avail itself of new computing technology to
condense the call-report data into key financial
ratios for each bank under its supervision. One
component of the NBSS, the Anomaly Severity
Ranking System, ranked selected bank ratios
within peer groups to detect outliers.
The FDIC and the Federal Reserve quickly
followed the OCC with similar screen-based
models of their own. In 1977, the FDIC intro-
duced the Integrated Monitoring System. One
component of this system was the humbly titled
“Just A Warning System,” which consisted of 12
financial ratios. The system compared each ratio
with a benchmark ratio determined by examiner
judgment. Banks with ratios that “failed” various
screens were flagged for additional follow-up.
The Federal Reserve adopted the Minimum Bank
Surveillance System (later, the Uniform Bank
Surveillance Screen), which examined seven
bank ratios. These ratios were weighted by their
Z-scores, which were then summed to yield a
composite score for each bank. MBSS, which
resulted from the research program described in
Korobow, Stuhr, and Martin (1977), was the first
surveillance model adopted by a supervisory
body to employ formal statistical techniques.
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The development of discrete-response regres-
sion techniques, together with the increased
availability of the computing power necessary to
apply them to large datasets, aided the advance-
ment of bank-distress models beginning in the
late 1970s (Hanweck, 1977, Korobow, Stuhr, and
Martin, 1977, and Martin, 1977). Because of its
analytical simplicity, the logistic specification has
been the favorite model of this type, although
arctangent and probit models have also appeared
occasionally.2 As pointed out by Martin (1977),
discriminant analysis can be viewed as a special
case of logistic regression in that the existence of
a unique linear discriminant function implies the
existence of a unique logit equation, whereas the
converse is not true. However, the existence of a
linear discriminant function is commonly rejected
when the number of observations of one class is
substantially smaller than that in the other class.
For this reason, early discriminant studies typi-
cally used subsamples of the population of safe
banks (which have always far outnumbered risky
banks by any measure), either matching them
according to certain non-risk characteristics or
randomly selecting the control sample. The use
of a logit model obviates the need for these restric-
tive sampling methods. 
Martin’s (1977) study set the standard for
discrete-response models of bank-failure predic-
tion. Whereas most previous research had focused
on a small sample of banks over two or three years,
Martin used all Fed-supervised institutions during
a seven-year period in the 1970s, yielding over
33,000 observations. In what would become a
standard approach, he confronted the data agnos-
tically with 25 financial ratios and ran several
different specifications in search of the best fit. He
found that capital ratios, liquidity measures, and
profitability were the most significant determinants
of failure over his sample period. Although Martin
did not employ direct measures of asset quality,
his indirect measures—provision expense and loan
concentration—also turned out to be significant. 
A host of other studies around the same time,
using both logit and discriminant analysis, con-
firmed these basic results. Table 2 summarizes a
selection of these papers. Poor asset quality and
low capital ratios are the two characteristics of
banks that have most consistently been associated
with banking problems over time (Sinkey, 1978).
Indeed, as described in Putnam (1983), early-
warning research in the 1970s and 1980s dis-
played a remarkable consistency in the variables
that emerged as important predictors of banking
problems: profitability, capital, asset quality, and
liquidity appeared as statistically significant in
almost every study, even though they were often
measured using different ratios.3
Motivated in part by the consistency of the
pattern of bank deterioration, the federal banking
agencies adopted the Uniform Financial Rating
System in November 1979.4 Under this system—
which is still the primary rating mechanism for
U.S. bank supervision—capital adequacy (C),
asset quality (A), management competence (M),
earnings performance (E), and liquidity risk (L)
are each explicitly evaluated by examiners and
rated on a 1 (best) to 5 (worst) scale. (Beginning
in 1997, sensitivity to market risk (S) was adopted
as a sixth component.) Examiners also assign a
composite rating (CAMELS) on the same scale,
reflecting the overall safety and soundness of the
institution.
From a supervisory perspective, modeling
CAMELS ratings allows examiners to observe
estimates of current supervisory ratings on a
quarterly basis, rather than only during an on-site
exam. The availability of consistent supervisory-
rating data beginning in 1979 allowed researchers
to employ ordered logit techniques to estimate
bank ratings. (See West, 1985; and Whalen and
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2 Linear regression analysis was explored early on by Meyer and
Pifer (1970).
3 More recently, some research has investigated the potential for
local and regional economic data to add information about future
banking conditions. However, the results have largely rejected this
idea (e.g., Meyer and Yeager, 2001; Nuxoll, O’Keefe, and Samolyk,
2003; and Yeager, 2004). On the other hand, Neely and Wheelock
(1997) show that bank earnings are highly correlated with state-
level personal-income growth.
4 Prior to 1979, the three federal regulatory agencies assigned banks
scores for capital (1 to 4), asset quality (A to D), and management
(S, F, or P), as well as a composite score (1 to 4).King, Nuxoll, Yeager
60 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
Table 1
Evolution of Key Off-Site Surveillance Systems
Screen-Based Systems Agency Period used
National Bank Surveillance System (NBSS) OCC 1975 to ?
Condensed the call-report data into key financial ratios and compared them to peer ratios. One output of the NBSS,
the Anomaly Severity Ranking System, ranked bank ratios by peer group to detect outliers. Another output was the
Bank Performance Report. In cooperation with the Fed and FDIC, the OCC transformed the Bank Performance Report
into the Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR). Although the OCC no longer uses the NBSS, the UBPR is used
presently by all federal and state supervisory agencies for both on-site and off-site analysis.
Minimum Bank Surveillance Screen (MBSS) Federal Reserve Late 1970s to mid-80s
Employed a set of ratios as off-site screens and added institutions that lay outside a critical range to an “exception list”
that received extra scrutiny. A composite score was also constructed by summing the normalized values of seven
of these ratios.
Integrated Monitoring System (IMS) FDIC 1977 to 1985
A screening device within the IMS, called the “Just A Warning System”(JAWS), compared 12 key financial ratios to
critical values as determined by examiner expertise. JAWS did not compute composite scores or make direct
comparisons to peer levels.
Uniform Bank Surveillance Screen (UBSS) Federal Reserve Mid-1980s to 1993
Improvement upon the MBSS. Computed peer-group percentiles of six financial ratios and summed them to derive
the composite score. Banks in the highest percentiles of the composite score were placed on a watch list.
Hybrid Systems Agency Period used
CAEL FDIC 1985 to late 1998
Replaced IMS. An “expert system,”designed to replicate the financial analysis that an examiner would perform to
assign an examination rating. Ratios were chosen to evaluate capital (C), asset quality (A), earnings (E), and liquidity (L).
Analysts subjectively determined the weights for each of the ratios that fed into the four CAEL components. The CAEL
components were multiplied by their respective weights and summed to yield a composite CAEL score.
Canary OCC 2000 to present
Canary consists of a package of tools organized into four components: Benchmarks, Credit Scope, Market Barometers,
and Predictive Models. Benchmarks are screen-based ratios that indicate risky thresholds. The Peer Group Risk Model
is a predictive model that projects a bank’s return on assets over the next three years under various economic
scenarios. King, Nuxoll, Yeager
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Table 1, cont’d
Limited-Dependent Variable Systems Agency Period used
System to Estimate Examination Ratings (SEER) Federal Reserve 1993 to present
Replaced the UBSS. First named the Financial Institutions Monitoring System, SEER is a logit model that consists of
two components, a “risk-rank”model that forecasts bank-failure probabilities and a “rating”model that estimates
current CAMELS scores.
Statistical CAMELS Off-site Rating (SCOR) FDIC 1998 to present
Replaced CAEL. Like SEER, the model consists of two components: a CAMELS downgrade forecast and a rating forecast.
The downgrade forecast computes the probability that a 1- or 2-rated bank will receive a 3, 4, or 5 rating at the next
examination. The OCC also uses output from the SCOR model in off-site surveillance.
CAMELS Downgrade Probability (CDP) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 1999 to present
Similar to the downgrade forecast of SCOR, the CDP estimates the probability that a 1- or 2-rated bank will be
downgraded to a 3, 4, or 5 rating over the next two years.
Forward-Looking Early-Warning Systems Agency Period used
Growth Monitoring Sytem (GMS) FDIC 2000 to present
Although GMS was initially developed as an expert system and implemented in the 1980s, it was revised significantly
in the late 1990s to employ explicit statistical techniques. GMS is a logit model of downgrades that estimates which
institutions that are currently rated satisfactory are most likely to be classified as problem banks at the end of three
years. Rather than using credit quality measures as independent variables, GMS includes forward-looking variables
such as loan growth and noncore funding that can be precursors of problems that have yet to manifest themselves.
Liquidity and Asset Growth Screen (LAGS) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2002 to present
LAGS is conceptually similar to GMS, but it uses a dynamic vector autoregression approach to forecast the set of
banks most likely to exploit moral hazard-incentives. Such banks exhibit rapid loan growth, increasing dependence
on funding sources with no market discipline, and declining capital ratios. Like GMS, the model uses forward-looking
variables.
Risk-Focused Systems Agency Period used
Real Estate Stress Test (REST) FDIC 2000 to present
REST attempts to identify those banks and thrifts that are most vulnerable to problems in real estate markets by
subjecting them to the same stress as the New England real estate crisis of the early 1990s. Forecast measures of bank
performance are translated to CAMELS ratings using the SCOR model. The result is a REST rating that ranges from
1 to 5.
Economic Value Model (EVM) Federal Reserve 1998 to present
The EVM is a duration-based economic value of equity model that estimates the loss in a bank’s market value of equity
given an instantaneous 200-basis-point interest rate increase. The model is useful to assess the bank’s long-run
sensitivity to interest rate risk.King, Nuxoll, Yeager
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Table 2
Comparison of Selected Early Studies Predicting Bank Condition
Model number (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Failure Rating Failure Failure Failure Rating Failure Rating
Technique OLS Discriminant Logit Probit Probit Factor + Logit Logit Factor + Logit
analysis
No. of observations 60 214 33,627 221 820 ~5,700 339 70
Sample period 1948-65 1967-68 1969-76 1971-76 1980-83 1980-82 1983-84 1983-86
Loans vs. securities mix XXXXXX
Efficiency, net operating  XXXXXX X
expense, or overhead
ROA or ROE X X X X X X
Capital/assets X X X X X X
Classified loans X X X X
Loan mix X X X X
Size X X X
Charge-offs X X
Deposit mix X X
Past-due or nonperforming  X X
loans
Liquid assets X X
Volatile liabilities or jumbo  X X
CDs
Dividend payout ratio X
Interest income, expense,  X
or margin
Interest-rate sensitivity X
Provision expense X X
Insider activity X
Income volatility X
Balance sheet volatility X




NOTE: Variables listed in the table are those included in each study. In most cases, variables were selected because of their significance,
and so the table also largely reflects variables that were significant in predicting bank problems. In some studies, some additional
variables were considered but they do not receive an “X” in the table because they were found to be statistically insignificant. The
studies referenced are (1) Meyer and Pifer, 1970; (2) Stuhr and van Wicklen, 1974; (3) Martin, 1977; (4) Hanweck, 1977; (5) Bovenzi,
Marino, and McFadden, 1983; (6) West, 1985; (7) Pantalone and Platt, 1987; and (8) Whalen and Thomson, 1988.Thomson, 1988.)5 Cole and Gunther (1998) demon-
strate that actual supervisory ratings can become
obsolete within as little as six months after being
assigned. Similarly, Hirtle and Lopez (1999) find
that the private supervisory information contained
in these ratings decays as they age. These studies
suggest that early-warning models that estimate
current supervisory ratings are useful tools for
supervisors to keep up with bank fundamentals
without incurring the cost of an examination.6
The FDIC’s CAEL model, introduced in 1985,
represented a significant breakthrough in off-site
monitoring devices. This “hybrid” system—a
discrete-response framework coupled with exam-
iner input—estimated ratings for four of the five
CAMEL components based on quarterly call-report
data. (‘M’ was not estimated.) For each CAEL
component, experienced examiners subjectively
weighted the relevant bank ratios; a rating table
then mapped the model output to a rating ranging
from 1 to 5. The rating table was updated each
quarter to mirror the actual distribution of compo-
nent CAMEL ratings in the previous year. CAEL
then weighted the four estimated components
themselves to yield a composite rating. In essence,
the model was a calibrated limited-dependent-
variable model, with examiner guidance replac-
ing the computationally intensive econometric
procedure.
The Current Surveillance Regime
A wealth of data on bank failures and CAMELS
ratings throughout the 1980s and the rapid pace
of computer technology in the 1980s and early
1990s allowed supervisory agencies to “catch up”
with the banking and econometric research and
develop off-site monitoring devices employing
limited-dependent-variable econometric tech-
niques. Table 3 compares the explanatory variables
used in select previous and current early-warning
systems. Two systems—SEER and SCOR—are
the primary surveillance tools used today by the
Fed and the FDIC, respectively. 
In 1993, the Federal Reserve adopted as its
in-house early-warning model the Financial
Institutions Monitoring System, which was modi-
fied slightly and renamed the System to Estimate
Examination Ratings (SEER). This model consists
of two components: a “risk-rank” or failure model
that estimates bank-failure probabilities and a
“rating” model that estimates current CAMELS
scores. The SEER failure model is designed to
detect deficiencies in balance sheet and income
statement ratios that are severe enough to cause
an outright failure or a critical shortfall in capital.
Because these events have been rare since the
inception of SEER, the variables and coefficient
estimates have remained frozen since they were
first estimated on late-1980s and early-1990s
failures. The SEER rating model, in contrast, is
reestimated on a quarterly basis, allowing for dif-
ferent coefficient estimates—and indeed different
independent variables—in each quarter. This
model has the advantage of allowing for new
sources of bank risk, but it can be difficult to inter-
pret changes in risk when the main driver of the
change is the inclusion of a variable that was not
present in the model in the previous quarter. The
two models are used together to achieve a balance
between flexibility and consistency. As Cole,
Cornyn, and Gunther (1995), Cole and Gunther
(1998), and Gilbert, Meyer, Vaughan (1999)
demonstrate, SEER’s performance is superior to
a variety of other early-warning systems, including
actual CAMELS scores assigned by examiners,
in terms of the trade-off between its type-I and
type-II error.7
King, Nuxoll, Yeager
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 63
5 West (1985) and Wang and Sauerhaft (1989) model supervisory
ratings in a factor-analytic framework. Supervisory ratings had
previously been used to measure composite risk in a discriminant-
analysis study by Stuhr and van Wicklen (1974). Two other, related,
lines of research begun in this period involve modeling time to
failure (rather than failure probability) and regulatory closure-
decision rules.  Examples of the time-to-failure models, which
typically involve Cox (1972) proportional-hazard specifications,
can be found in Lane, Looney, and Wansley (1986), Whalen (1991),
Helwege (1996), and Wheelock and Wilson (1995, 2000, 2005).
For models of supervisory closure behavior, see Barth et al. (1989),
Demirgüç-Kunt (1989), Thomson (1992), and Cole (1993).
6 It is important to recognize that these models are intended as comple-
ments to, rather than substitutes for, on-site examination. Although
CAMELS ratings do become stale rather quickly, Nuxoll, O’Keefe, and
Samolyk (2003) and Wheelock and Wilson (2005) show that they still
retain marginal predictive power for failures, beyond that contained
in the call-report data. Thus, on-site examination appears to recover
some information that is not available in bank financial statements.
7 In this case, a type-I error occurs when a bank is not predicted to
fail but does. A type-II error occurs when a bank is predicted to fail
but does not. For obvious reasons, regulators are more concerned
with type-I errors.King, Nuxoll, Yeager
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Table 3
Comparison of Early-Warning Systems
JAWS UBSS CAEL SEER SCOR Downgrade GMS LAGS
Agency FDIC FRB FDIC FRB FDIC FRB FDIC FRB
Model type Screens Screens Hybrid Logit Logit Logit Logit VAR
Tier-1 or tangible capital XXXXXX X
Total or risk-weighted X X X
assets
Past due 30 XXXX
Past due 90  XXXXX
Nonaccruals XXXX
OREO XXXX
Residential real estate loans X X X
C&I loans X X
Securities X X X
Jumbo CDs X X X
Net Income (ROA) XXXXXX
Charge-offs X X
Provision expense X X X
Liquid assets X X X
Loan growth X X
Total or risk-weighted  X X X
asset growth
Volatile liability expense X
Volatile liabilities X X X
Loan-loss reserves X X
Loan/deposit ratio X X
Interest expense X
Loans and long-term X X
securities
NCNRP funding X
Operating expenses or X X
revenues
Change in capital X X X
Change in deposits X
Dividends X
Region




NOTE: For purposes of comparison, some liberties have been taken with variable definitions, e.g., such categories as liquid assets and
tangible capital have been defined in slightly different ways in the various models and the construction of certain ratios differs slightly.In 1998, the FDIC developed a model similar
to SEER, known as the Statistical CAMELS Offsite
Rating (SCOR). The SCOR model, which replaced
CAEL, also consists of two components: a rating
forecast and a CAMELS-downgrade forecast.8
The rating component of the FDIC’s SCOR model
is similar to the SEER rating model. SCOR uses a
multinomial logit model to estimate a composite
CAMELS rating as well as ratings for all six of the
CAMELS components, in keeping with the for-
mulation of the preceding CAEL system. SCOR’s
downgrade component estimates probabilities
that safe banks (those with ratings of 1 or 2) will
receive ratings of 3, 4, or 5 at the next examination.
The Federal Reserve has recently undertaken
a similar effort in modeling downgrades. Gilbert,
Meyer, and Vaughan (2002) use a logistic model
to estimate downgrade probabilities for CAMELS
composites. The authors concluded that the
variables included in SEER were also the most
appropriate for their purposes; but one advantage
of the CAMELS downgrade model relative to the
SEER failure model is the ability to update the
coefficients on a periodic basis.
In sum, researchers and practitioners have
made considerable progress in developing models
to predict bank distress. However, as we discuss
below, these models must be complemented with
newer models to account for evolution in the
banking industry and nontraditional sources of
bank risk.
THE NEED FOR NEW WORK
The sophistication of off-site early-warning
systems since 1970 has certainly improved; but,
given the dramatic changes in the banking sector
over the past decade, we may expect that the
current systems—like the screen-based mecha-
nisms that preceded them—have already fallen
behind the pace of financial evolution.9 The main
criticism of prevailing early-warning techniques
is the implicit assumption that future episodes
of bank distress will look similar to past episodes
of distress. However, significant changes in the
banking environment since 1990 combined with
empirical evidence that bank-distress patterns
may be changing suggest that new early-warning
research is needed.
Recent Changes in the Banking
Environment 
Shifts in the banking environment erode
confidence in early-warning models because the
future is less likely to reflect the past. Since 1990,
banks have faced significant legislative, financial,
and technological innovations.
The post-1990 legislation, summarized in
Table 4, intended to impose more market discipline
on banks and remove anti-competitive barriers.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 and the National
Depositor Preference Act of 1993 shifted more
of the burden of bank failure from taxpayers to
uninsured creditors. Several studies have docu-
mented the changes in market discipline that
appear to have been caused by this legislation
(Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Cornett, Mehran,
and Tehranian, 1998; Marino and Bennett, 1999;
Hall et al., 2002; Goldberg and Hudgins, 2002;
Flannery and Rangan, 2003; and King, 2005). In
addition, legislation removed geographic branch-
ing restrictions (Riegle-Neal Act of 1994) and prod-
uct restrictions (Financial Services Modernization
Act of 1999). Many banks have expanded into
investment banking, insurance, and other financial
services, and a small but increasing fraction of
bank revenue derives from fee income generated by
these operations (Yeager, Yeager, and Harshman,
2005). A likely outcome of these legislative
changes is a more competitive banking industry
that has the ability to assume different kinds of
credit risk than it assumed in the past.
In addition to the legislative changes, financial
markets have widened and deepened, presenting
banks with new asset and liability management
opportunities and challenges. Previously illiquid
assets have become more liquid as secondary mar-
kets have developed and government-sponsored
enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
have facilitated the growth of the mortgage market.
Many of these products, however, contain embed-
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8 See Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther (1995) and Collier et al. (2003a).
9 Hooks (1995) and Helwege (1996) provide evidence on the param-
eter instability of traditional early-warning models over time.ded options that could increase exposure to
interest rate risk. Liabilities have also evolved since
1990. Banks are relying increasingly on noncore
funding such as brokered deposits and jumbo CDs
(over $100,000) as traditional checking and savings
accounts and local CDs are shrinking. In addition,
the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) opened its
doors to commercial banks in 1989, quickly becom-
ing an important nondeposit source of funding.
(See Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager, 2001;
Bennett et al., 2005; and Craig and Thomson, 2003.)
These changes potentially alter both interest rate
and liquidity risks. Derivatives usage at commercial
banks has also exploded—the notional amount of
derivatives at commercial banks increased tenfold
to more than $70 trillion between 1991 and 2003.
Derivatives can be used to hedge risk, but they can
also be used to speculate on market movements.10
In addition, over-the-counter derivatives poten-
tially expose banks to counterparty risk.
Finally, as in many other industries, techno-
logical innovations revolutionized the business
of banking in the 1990s. Electronic payments,
online banking, and credit scoring are now com-
mon and quickly growing activities. As Claessens,
Glaessner, and Klingebiel (2002) argue, these
developments have the potential to change the
competitive landscape dramatically. They also
allow for increased operational risk, including
data theft from security vulnerabilities and the
facilitation of money laundering.
Overall, the new products and markets that
have become available to banks in the past decade
provide opportunities to diversify and hedge risk
in new ways. Yet they also carry dangers—if they
are not fully understood or properly managed,
new business lines may end up increasing risks
King, Nuxoll, Yeager
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Table 4
Key Legislative Changes in the 1990s
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)
Opened FHLB membership to commercial banks. Previously membership had been available only to thrifts and
certain insurance companies. Advances from the FHLB are a ready source of non-risk-priced funding. Over two-
thirds of all banks are now FHLB members, and over half of them routinely utilize advances. As Stojanovic, Vaughan,
and Yeager (2001) show, risky banks are more likely to rely on advances than safer banks.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA)
Restricted regulatory forbearance and creditor protection through prompt corrective action and least-cost-resolution
provisions. This legislation may have induced greater discipline in uninsured credit markets (see Goldberg and
Hudgins, 2002 and Hall et al., 2002), resulting in higher funding costs and different liability structures for troubled
institutions. Mandatory closure rules potentially increased the mean and reduced the variance of the capital levels
of failing banks.
National Depositor Preference (1993)
Enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, this legislation changed the failure-resolution
hierarchy to make domestic depositors more senior claimants than foreign depositors. Like FDICIA, this legislation
may have changed funding costs for risky banks and caused them to rearrange their liability structures. See Marino
and Bennet (1999).
Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
Allowed bank branching across state lines. Although this Act allowed for greater geographic diversification, it also
exposed banks to increased competition.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (Financial Services Modernization Act)
Repealed the Glass-Steagal Act and allowed financial holding companies to engage in insurance, securities under-
writing and brokerage services, and merchant banking. This Act introduced new potential sources of risk in banking,
although it facilitated the diversification of some traditional sources of risk.
10 The literature on the risk effects of derivative use is large. Recent
contributions include Instefjord (2005), Duffee and Zhou (2001),
and Sinkey and Carter (2000).for banks that move into them too hastily. With
the increasing intensity of competition, many
institutions have likely been tempted to do
exactly that. The net effect on banks’ risk positions
is an empirical question.
Evidence of Changes in the Nature of
Bank Distress
Although none of the institutional changes
mentioned above necessarily implies any funda-
mental change in the process through which banks
deteriorate, together they constitute a prima facie
case that, at the very least, the previous results
should be reaffirmed. Simple empirical analysis
indicates that some of the above changes may
indeed have had an impact on the typical pattern
of bank distress. Figure 1 plots nine key ratio
averages for failing banks in the 12 quarters lead-
ing to failure between 1984 and 1994 and between
1995 and 2003 against the contemporaneous
averages for banks that did not fail.11 Of course,
the number of failures in the earlier period was
much larger—1,371 compared with 44—yet the
patterns that emerge suggest that many character-
istics of banks in the quarters before failure may
have changed between the two time periods.
Table 5, which reports difference-of-means tests
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Table 5
Trends at Failed Banks, Before and After 1995
Comparison of  
Comparison of ratios at failed banks ratios at failed banks less peer values
Difference Difference 
Quarters prior  1995-2003 1984-94 of means (%) 1995-2003 1984-94 of means (%)
Variable to failure (%) (%) (t-statistic) (%) (%) (t-statistic)
Jumbo CDs 1 14.70 18.80 –4.10** (–2.06) 4.10 9.30 –5.2*** (–2.65)
6 13.40 21.30 –7.90*** (–5.04) 3.60 12.10 –8.5*** (–5.46)
Federal funds  1 0.37 0.99 –0.62*** (–3.30) –1.15 –0.20 –0.95*** (–5.07)
purchased 6 0.77 1.29 –0.52 (–1.64) –0.69 0.17 –0.86*** (–2.72)
Demand deposits 1 12.70 14.90 –2.20 (–1.23) 0.70 –4.80 5.5*** (–3.12)
6 11.70 15.20 –3.5** (–1.99) –0.40 –6.30 5.8*** (–3.29)
Loan-loss  1 4.04 3.14 0.90** (–2.15) 2.51 1.90 0.61 (–1.46)
reserves/loans 6 2.63 1.87 0.76*** (–3.7) 1.06 0.67 0.38* (–1.86)
Cash & due 1 7.11 8.20 –1.08 (–1.28) 1.81 –0.45 2.26*** (–2.67)
6 6.14 9.03 –2.89*** (–3.7) 0.85 0.17 0.68 (–0.87)
Commercial real  1 15.80 11.60 4.1** (–2.16) –0.10 3.10 –3.3* (–1.70)
estate loans 6 15.80 11.60 4.2** (–2.36) 1.10 3.50 –2.50 (–1.40)
Fee income 1 2.57 1.11 1.46** (–2.44) 1.58 0.34 1.24** (–2.07)
6 2.87 1.00 1.86 (–1.59) 1.91 0.29 1.62 (–1.38)
OREO 1 1.70 3.48 –1.78*** (–3.78) 1.54 3.11 –1.57*** (–3.33)
6 1.49 1.70 –0.22 (–0.55) 1.30 1.40 –0.10 (–0.25)
Total assets 1 $133M $161M –28M (–0.57) –$88M $47M –$135M*** (–2.72)
6 $137M $192M –$55M (–0.88) –$51M $88M –$139M** (–2.23)
NOTE: This table shows differences in means for selected risk variables between failing banks in the period 1995-2003 compared with
those in 1984-94. Both the differences in levels and the differences in levels less peer values for the corresponding periods are given,
at both 1- and 6-quarter horizons. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All of the
nine variables reported here have exhibited significant changes since 1995 (by at least one of these difference-of-means tests) in their
patterns as failure approaches.
11 The December 1994 cutoff was chosen to exclude the failures of
the early-1990s banking crisis from the more recent sample. Other
break dates around the same time yield similar results. King, Nuxoll, Yeager
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Trends at Failed Banks, Before and After 1995
NOTE: This figure presents the information in Table 5 in graphical form. In each case, the thin black line indicates the path of a failing
bank as the failure date approaches and the thick blue line indicates the average values for non-failing banks. Values on the horizontal
axis indicate the number of quarters prior to failure. For every variable reported here, there is an obvious change in the pattern
between the two periods.for the same series, shows that, despite the low
number of failure observations in the second
period, many of these changes are statistically
significant. (The table reports the tests for one
and six quarters prior to failure. The choice of
the six-quarter horizon reflects the average time
between bank exams.)
Failing banks in the 1995-2003 period had
lower relative levels of liquidity risk than banks
in the 1984-94 period. Specifically, between 1995
and 2003, failing banks relied substantially less
on jumbo CDs and the purchase of federal funds,
both in absolute terms and relative to safe banks.
Although the ratio of demand deposits to total
assets was lower for all banks in the later period,
failing banks between 1995 and 2003 had ratios
nearly identical to those at non-failing banks. In
contrast, failing banks on average had significantly
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Trends at Failed Banks, Before and After 1995fewer demand deposits as a percentage of assets
than non-failing banks in the 1984-94 period.
Finally, the cash-to-assets ratio increased at failing
banks in the quarters leading up to failure in the
1995-2003 period, whereas that ratio displayed
little pre-failure trend in the earlier period. These
interperiod differences in liquidity risk could
reflect the increased depositor discipline imposed
by the legislative changes of the 1990s, as risky
banks in the 1995-2003 period may have had a
more difficult time attracting uninsured funds.
Credit-risk ratios also reflect significant dif-
ferences between the two periods. Commercial
real estate lending was significantly higher (about
4 percentage points, scaled by assets) at failing
banks relative to non-failing banks in the earlier
King, Nuxoll, Yeager
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Trends at Failed Banks, Before and After 1995period. In the later period the ratio was about the
same at both failing and non-failing banks. Other
real estate owned (OREO) as a percent of assets,
previously one of the best predictors of failure,
did not change substantially in the 1995-2003
period during the quarters leading up to failure.
Although this ratio continues to be somewhat
higher at failing banks relative to non-failing banks,
the gap has shrunk, and the upward trend has
nearly vanished. The loan loss reserves–to–total
loans ratio was higher for failure banks in the
later period than in the earlier period, although
the ratio increased prior to failure in both time
periods. The diminished importance of credit-risk
ratios could reflect the improved risk-management
processes at banks facilitated by the deepening
of financial markets. Indeed, Schuermann (2004)
argues that most banks came through the 2001
recession in excellent shape in part because of
more effective risk management. Advances in
credit scoring allowed banks to better risk-price
their syndicated, retail, and small-business loans.
Two other ratios demonstrate the increased
importance of diversification and nontraditional
lines of business in recent years. Fee income as a
percentage of assets, which was previously about
the same at safe and failing banks, is now substan-
tially higher for failing banks. Finally, failing banks
were larger on average than non-failing banks in
the earlier period but smaller in the later period,
potentially reflecting the diversification benefits
that banks receive from expanding in size and
product offerings.
Despite the differences, we should be cautious
about drawing strong conclusions from these
graphs. The 1995-2003 sample contains only 44
bank-failure observations, so that, although most
of our statistical tests yield statistically significant
differences, the sample may not be entirely repre-
sentative. In addition, some series that we have
not emphasized have remained fairly constant.
For example, failing banks continue to hold fewer
mortgages and securities, and the pattern of capital
deterioration has changed little. However, the fact
remains that fundamental shifts in the banking
environment make it possible that the path to
bank distress has changed, and the recent data
that are available are at least consistent with this
possibility. Moreover, the shifts in the data—in
variables associated with liquidity, credit, and
operational risk—line up well with the types of
institutional changes we know occurred during
this period.
Because much of the academic research and
most of the prevailing early-warning systems are
based on data from the 1984-94 period, the above
comparison gives us cause for concern. Indeed,
these models tend to emphasize the variables that
our evidence indicates have been most affected
by the recent institutional changes. For example,
eight of the eleven variables in SEER and 10 of the
12 variables in SCOR reflect either asset quality or
liquidity. Recognition of the recent fundamental
shifts in the nature of banking has motivated
supervisors to consider new approaches to off-site
monitoring.
NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
BANK-DISTRESS MODELS
In this section we describe some recent
attempts by supervisory economists to build
bank-distress models that (i) are less vulnerable
than traditional models to the changing banking
environment and (ii) are designed to assess risks
that current models potentially overlook. We group
the new models into two types: forward-looking
models and risk-focused models. Forward-looking
early-warning models may prove more robust to
the changing bank environment because they rely
on theory rather than past financial ratios to detect
the circumstances that can lead banks to increase
risk-taking. Risk-focused models reflect the shift
to risk-focused supervision as explained in the
Board of Governor’s Supervision and Regulation
Letter 97-25 titled “Risk-Focused Framework for
the Supervision of Community Banks.” The docu-
ment, dated October 1, 1997, states the following:
The objective of a risk-focused examination is
to effectively evaluate the safety and soundness
of the bank...focusing resources on the bank’s
highest risks. The exercise of examiner judg-
ment to determine the scope of the examination
during the planning process is crucial to the
implementation of the risk-focused supervision
framework, which provides obvious benefits
King, Nuxoll, Yeager
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 71such as higher quality examinations, increased
efficiency, and reduced on-site examiner time...
[E]ach Reserve Bank maintains various surveil-
lance reports that identify outliers when a bank
is compared to its peer group. The review of
this information assists examiners in identify-
ing both the strengths and vulnerabilities of
the bank and provides a foundation from which
to determine the examination activities to be
conducted.
Rather than identifying banks with high levels
of overall risk, risk-focused monitoring devices
attempt to assess the particular risks of banking
organizations, allowing examiners to allocate
resources to upcoming exams more efficiently.
Risk-focused models have the added advantage
that they scrutinize risks that traditional models
may overlook because those risks were not sys-
tematically important in historical episodes of
bank distress. We emphasize, however, that the
new models should be viewed as complements
to rather than substitutes for the more compre-
hensive and time-tested systems.
Forward-Looking Models
Forward-looking models tend to focus on
asset growth and liquidity as key risk indicators.
Adverse selection and moral hazard incentives
provide complementary stories for why banks
pursuing rapid asset-growth strategies may be
ramping up risk.
The adverse selection story views banks as
having well-established relationships with a core
set of customers. On the liability side of the balance
sheet, these customers provide stable low-cost
funding, while on the asset side the bank has
information about the creditworthiness of these
customers that generally is not available to other
lenders. Banks that pursue a rapid growth strategy
must move into new markets or offer new products,
finding both a new set of borrowers and the funds
to finance the growth. Although growth is not a
problem per se, the bank will suffer from adverse
selection if its pool of prospective new borrowers
is composed disproportionately of those who
have been rejected by other banks. The question
is whether the bank has sufficient expertise and
devotes sufficient resources to address the credit
problems inherent in rapid growth. These prob-
lems are not observable immediately because it
takes time for loans to become delinquent.
The moral hazard story views deposit insur-
ance and other sources of collateralized funding
as vehicles for bank risk-taking. Banks keep the
profits if the risks pay off, but leave the losses to
the FDIC in the event of failure. Banks with rela-
tively high capital ratios have incentives to man-
age their banks prudently because the owners of
the bank have their own funds at stake. If capital
ratios begin to slip, however, those incentives may
erode (Keeley, 1990). When bank performance
begins to deteriorate for whatever reason, man-
agers and owners increasingly face the prospect
of losing their wealth and jobs should regulators
close the bank. Rather than watch the bank fail,
management might prefer to gamble for resurrec-
tion by booking high-risk loans funded with
insured or collateralized funding. Indeed, this
type of behavior is often blamed, in part, for the
magnitude of the 1980s’ thrift crisis (White, 1991).
Banks traditionally have tried to avoid market
discipline by relying on core deposits, and some
evidence suggests that riskier banks shift to core
funding for exactly this reason.12 Managers adopt-
ing this strategy, however, run up against two
constraints. First, banks that deliberately try to
sidestep market discipline with FDIC-insured
deposits may invite greater regulatory scrutiny.
Second, the limited supply of core funding
imposes a natural ceiling on asset growth. Since
the early 1990s, competition for insured deposits
has intensified. Faced with less insured funding
and greater demand for bank assets, managers
have sought new funding sources. Banks that want
to grow quickly but are unwilling to pay the risk
premia demanded by uninsured liability holders
may turn to noncore, non-risk-priced (NCNRP)
sources of funding such as insured brokered
deposits and FHLB advances. Brokered deposits
funded much of the risky growth at thrifts during
the 1980s. FHLB advances, which were histori-
cally available only to thrifts but became avail-
able to commercial banks in 1989, have many of
12 Billet, Garfinkle, and O’Neal (1998).
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types of funding are easily accessible in large
quantities, and neither is priced according to the
failure risk of the borrower. Brokered deposits
are insured by the FDIC, while FHLB advances
are fully collateralized. The lenders, therefore,
have little incentive to monitor a borrowing bank’s
condition.
As Figure 2 illustrates, bank reliance on bro-
kered deposits and FHLB advances is at an histor-
ically high level, both in absolute terms and as a
percentage of total bank assets. Advances in par-
ticular have grown from essentially 0 to 3.5 percent
of banks’ balance sheets since the early 1990s.
Furthermore, rapid loan growth has accompanied
the growth in noncore funding at many institu-
tions. Between 1994 and 2004, bank lending
increased 39 percent faster than total national
income. Although aggregate capital levels and
overall bank condition remained relatively sound
over this period, the rapid growth could be an
indication of imprudent lending. The FDIC and
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis have inde-
pendently developed alternative early-warning
models called the Growth Monitoring System
(GMS) and the Liquidity and Asset Growth Screen
(LAGS), respectively, to address the adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard concerns. We briefly
describe each in turn.
Growth Monitoring System. The FDIC has
used the GMS as part of its off-site review process
since the mid-1980s. The original model was an
“expert system” in that its parameter values
were assigned based on professional judgment,
rather than statistical analysis. Weights were
assigned to a number of growth-related variables
in an attempt to identify those institutions most
in danger of a rating downgrade. In the late 1990s,
the FDIC developed a new version of this model
using statistical techniques. This newer version
of GMS, implemented in 2000, uses a logit model
of downgrades, much like more traditional
models, estimating which institutions that are
King, Nuxoll, Yeager
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13 Stojanovic, Vaughan, Yeager (2001) provide further discussion of
why the FHLB might create incentives for abnormal risk-taking and
evidence in support of this hypothesis. Wang and Sauerhaft (1989)
show that thrift reliance on FHLB advances and brokered deposits
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Figure 2
Noncore, Non-Risk-Priced Funding at U.S. Banks currently rated satisfactory are most likely to be
classified as problem banks at the end of three
years. Rather than using credit-quality measures
as independent variables, GMS includes forward-
looking variables that can be precursors of prob-
lems that have yet to become manifest. The key
variables in the model are indicated in Table 3.14
Two variables have the most effect on the results:
loan growth and noncore funding. Although the
coefficient magnitudes vary somewhat over time,
they are both statistically and economically sig-
nificant. More rapid loan growth and heavy
dependence on noncore funding generally lead
to higher estimated default probabilities.
Back-testing of GMS shows that the model has
significant forecasting power.15 Between 1996
and 2000, approximately 30 percent of the banks
with GMS rankings at or above the 98th percentile
received a rating of 3 or worse over the next five
years.16 Among the banks with rankings at the
79th percentile or lower, just 8 percent were
downgraded, so banks in the top two percentiles
were approximately two and a half times more
likely to receive a rating of 3 or worse.
The performance of GMS is even better when
flagging more severe problems. Banks with GMS
rankings at or above the 98th percentile were
downgraded to a CAMELS 4 or 5 or failed 9.5
percent of the time; in contrast, banks with GMS
ratings in the lower 79th percentile were down-
graded to a rating of 4 or 5 or failed only 1.3 per-
cent of the time. Finally, banks with GMS rankings
at or above the 98th percentile were over eight
times more likely to fail (0.76 percent) than those
banks with rankings in the 79th percentile or
lower (0.09 percent). It should be noted that while
the GMS model has notable success in identifying
risky institutions, many banks with high GMS
rankings are never downgraded. In other words,
the type-II error rate is high.
Liquidity and Asset Growth Screen. Like
GMS, LAGS attempts to flag banks that use
particular funding vehicles to fuel rapid asset
growth. The central idea is that a bank that
experiences a combination of falling capital
ratios, rapid asset growth, and a surge in non-
core, non-risk-priced funding exhibits the classic
characteristics of moral hazard.
The LAGS model consists of ten separate
panel vector autoregressions (VARs), identical in
their variables but estimated on banks of different
inflation-adjusted asset classes. The four depend-
ent variables in the VARs are the quarterly growth
rate of risk-weighted assets; the ratio of brokered
deposits and FHLB advances to total assets; the
CAMELS composite score; and the ratio of equity
to total assets.17 The equations are estimated on
rolling samples of quarterly data, updated every
three months to include the most recent figures
available. The key variable in the model is the
CAMELS score. Banks that have higher fore-
casted CAMELS ratings over a three-year horizon
are interpreted as being in greater danger of moral-
hazard-induced risk.
The charts in Figure 3 show how LAGS works
for a hypothetical bank as of June 2004. In each of
the four panels, the data to the left of the vertical
black lines represent the bank’s behavior over
the previous two years. To the right of the black
lines, the graphs show the LAGS forecasts. LAGS
predicts that the sample bank’s CAMELS score
will rise from its present level of 1 to 1.78 over
the next three years. LAGS ranks banking insti-
tutions by the predicted rise in total risk.
A closer look at the sample bank’s recent his-
tory gives us an idea of why the model predicts
14 Noncore funding, loans to total assets, and assets per employee
are adjusted for size peers. The growth variables and the change
in loan mix are not adjusted because there is no evidence that the
size peers differ. All growth rates are measured year over year to
avoid problems of seasonal adjustment. The growth rates of loans
and assets are adjusted for mergers, but the growth rates in non-
core funding and equity are not. This adjustment means that the
model ignores acquisitions unless the acquisitions have eroded
equity or made the bank more dependent on noncore funding.
15 The GMS system has also had particular success identifying
recent failures due to fraud, although the exact reasons for this
success require further investigation.
16 Of course, the full five years has not passed for ratings assigned in
the year 2000. The results are for those banks that survived five
years or that filed a September 2003 call report. 
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17 Eight quarterly lags of each of these four variables are included as
regressors in each of the four equations. The equations also include
intercept terms. In total, then, LAGS consists of 40 linear regression
equations each containing 36 variables. Banks are excluded from
the sample if they are less than eight quarters old or have merged
with another institution within the previous eight quarters. As of
June 30, 2004, the dataset included approximately 175,000
observations.such a dramatic rise in risk. The bank grew rapidly
between June 2002 and June 2004, increasing its
assets by half and ratcheting up its risk-weighted
asset ratio. The bank funded a substantial portion
of this growth with FHLB advances and brokered
deposits. As of June 2004, these liabilities sup-
ported over 35 percent of the bank’s total assets,
a ratio that rose more than 10 percentage points
during the previous two years. Meanwhile, capital
declined by about 100 basis points. The bank, there-
fore, displays key moral hazard characteristics.
Given the narrow focus of the LAGS model,
we would not expect its performance to be as
impressive as that of a more comprehensive model
such as SEER, yet LAGS does display significant
discriminatory ability. Between March 1998 and
June 2001, 21.7 percent of banks with a CAMELS
rating of 2 and a LAGS score at the 90th percentile
or above were downgraded to a CAMELS score
of 3, 4, or 5 or failed within the following three
years. In addition, 47.1 percent of the 2-rated
banks with a LAGS score at the 99th percentile
or above were downgraded or failed within three
years. By contrast, only 12.7 percent of banks
below the 90th percentile were subsequently
downgraded or failed.18
Risk-Focused Models
In addition to becoming more forward-looking,
bank-distress models are also evolving to accom-
modate the risk-focused framework. Several
off-site–monitoring devices have already been
King, Nuxoll, Yeager
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LAGS Forecasts for an Anonymous Bank as of June 2004 
18 As noted, the LAGS coefficients are reestimated every quarter.
The numbers reported in this paragraph reflect the estimates
actually used in each quarter (rather than, say, the most recent
set). In other words, they reflect out-of-sample forecasting ability. developed by the FDIC and the Federal Reserve,
and more are in development. We describe two
of these models here.
Real Estate Stress Test. Real estate crises have
been perennial causes of bank failures.19 In 2000,
the FDIC implemented a Real Estate Stress Test
(REST) that attempts to identify those banks and
thrifts that are most vulnerable to problems in
real estate markets.20
The REST model incorporates the experience
of the New England real estate crisis of the early
1990s. Conceptually, the model subjects banks
to the same stress as that crisis and forecasts the
resulting CAMELS ratings. REST was developed
by regressing performance data for New England
banks in December 1990 on performance and
portfolio data for the same banks in December
1987. These regressions identify the factors that
were observable in 1987 that later were associated
with safety and soundness concerns. A concen-
tration in construction and development loans
is the primary risk factor, but there are a host of
secondary factors, such as concentrations in
commercial mortgages, commercial and industrial
loans, mortgages on multifamily housing, reliance
on noncore funding, and rapid growth. These
regressions are used to forecast measures of bank
performance which are then translated to CAMELS
ratings using the SCOR model. The result is a
REST rating that ranges from 1 to 5. The output
from the model is distributed to FDIC examiners
as well as examiners from other federal and state
banking agencies. The model has been validated
using data from other real estate downturns; it
can identify banks that are vulnerable from real
estate exposure three to seven years in advance.
Because of the long horizon, banks with poor
REST ratings are not an immediate concern. More
importantly, the model does not consider the
underwriting standards and other aspects of risk
management that the bank uses to control its
exposure to real estate downturns. Consequently,
examiners use the output from the REST model
for examination planning. The model produces a
set of “weights” indicating which variables are
the most responsible for the poor rating, giving
examiners a sense of the aspects of a bank’s oper-
ations that deserve the most attention.
Interest Rate Risk. The savings and loan
crisis of the 1980s focused increased attention
in the banking industry on interest rate risk.
Economists at the Board of Governors responded
by developing a duration-based measure of
interest rate risk that could be used for surveil-
lance and risk-scoping purposes.21 The model,
titled the Economic Value Model (EVM), was
launched in the first quarter of 1998 by producing
a confidential quarterly surveillance report (called
the Focus report) for each commercial bank.
The EVM aggregates balance sheet items into
various buckets based upon maturity and option-
ality. The model then uses the duration from a
proxy financial instrument for each bucket to
calculate the “risk weight,” or the change in eco-
nomic value of those items that would result from
a 200-basis-point instantaneous rise in rates. For
example, the EVM places all residential mortgages
that reprice or mature within 5 to 15 years in the
same bucket. If the risk weight for the 5- to 15-year
mortgages were 7.0, the value of the 5- to 15-year
mortgages would be estimated to decline by 7.0
percent following an immediate 200-basis-point
rate hike. The change in economic value is
repeated for each balance sheet bucket. The pre-
dicted change in economic value of the bank’s
equity, then, is the difference between the pre-
dicted change in assets and the predicted change
in liabilities.
Recent research by Sierra and Yeager (2004)
shows that the EVM effectively ranks banks by
their exposure to rising interest rates. That is,
banks that the model predicts to be the most vul-
nerable to rising interest rates suffer the largest
declines in income and equity following an interest
rate hike. These banks also show the largest gains
in income and equity following interest rate
declines. Bank supervisors can use the model’s
output to rank banks by interest rate risk. If a bank
is found to be an outlier, the examiner in charge
will emphasize that risk in the next exam.
21 See Embersit and Houpt (1991) and Houpt and Wright (1996) for
details.
King, Nuxoll, Yeager
76 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
19 See Herring and Wachter (1999).
20 See Collier et al. (2003b).CONCLUSION
After their initial introduction in the 1970s,
studies on the causes of bank distress made rapid
progress, fueled by considerable academic interest.
In recent years, this interest has waned outside
the regulatory community, possibly reflecting a
belief that the causes of bank distress are well
understood. However, significant legislative,
financial, and technological innovations may
make it necessary to supplement the prevailing
academic and regulatory models with a new gen-
eration of forward-looking and risk-focused moni-
toring systems.
Newer forward-looking models at the FDIC
and the Federal Reserve include the Growth
Monitoring System and the Liquidity and Asset-
Growth Screen. Risk-focused models include the
Real Estate Stress Test and the Economic Value
Model. Additional monitoring devices such as
those analyzing liquidity risk, operational risk,
and counterparty risk seem promising lines of
inquiry.
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